


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DEMOCRACY AS A REFLECTION OF HUMAN  
NATURE: DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS



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**DEMOCRACY AS A REFLECTION OF HUMAN NATURE:  
DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS.**

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## INDEX

INTRODUCTION	3
I. CHAPTER 1: DEFINING HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIETY	9
A. Human Nature	9
1. Self-directed side	10
2. Other-directed side	13
B. Society	17
1. Natural tendency toward society inherent to human nature	17
2. Individuals as a product of the society	18
3. The society as a product of individuals	18
II. CHAPTER 2: AMBIGUOUS FRAMEWORK	24
A. Understanding Democracy	24
B. Fragility within democracy's arrangements	27
1. Public interests vs Private interests	31
2. Public Deliberation vs Meaningless Words	33
3. Qualified participation vs increased participation	37
III. CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGING PEOPLE'S IDEALS REGARDING DEMOCRACY	40
A. Expectations and Imbalances	40
B. Oxymoronic concepts	43
C. Melting away the imbalances	48
CONCLUSION	53
BIBLIOGRAPHY	56

## INTRODUCTION

Humanity has proven to be both puzzling and ambiguous by way of its instinctive pursuit of happiness through reason. Tending to act rationally, while fluctuating between stoic and epicurean inclinations, preferences, beliefs and interpretations often serve to fulfill a presumably ultimate goal: to avoid pain and to seek pleasure. Thus, when human nature is reduced to its core elements, a striking fact is made manifest: though every person has individual and subjective pursuits, and seeks to maximize private utility by way of knowledge and power, humans need to create associations to satisfy their everyday needs. As Aristotle (trans. 2013) argued, “*man is by nature a political animal*” (bk I, sect. II); then, community is the essential foundation to preserve and achieve human flourishing.

Hence, Western modernity requires a perception and understanding that takes into account the idea of interdependence between people. While such a society is the result of human interaction, which represents a tool for human beings to fulfill their ultimate private preferences, a multiplicity of interests can offset one another. It is, therefore, necessary for individual members to coordinate their actions within their given group in order to secure an average shared benefit. However, if coordination is not possible, then there will be no shared benefit.

Furthermore, within human nature, there is another struggle that creates a conflict of interest where the needs of a community, whose fundamental components include reciprocity, clashes with the needs of the individual. At first sight, two possible methods emerge to overcome this dissension: 1) to value community over subjective preferences, exercising honesty and empathy; or 2) to act strategically, beyond moral values, anticipating actions that hinder the reduction of subjective interests in order to maximize utility.

One of the most remarkable aspects of this problem is that societies, as a result of people's tacit consent to agree to rules that protect rights and property, often seek out what is commonly accepted as the greater good. Affected by dissension within human nature, however, they display both noble and ignoble agendas, which are either complementary or divergent, and in an intense rivalry, they often compete for dominance within a given polity. Bearing this in mind, when we think about how democratic government is dependent upon the people's legitimate authority, we must analyze under what circumstances, if any, is it possible to achieve a sustainable democracy, overcoming the fact that it is a reflection of the dissension within human nature. In the light of this question, we would be able to think about the constituent principles of democratic systems evaluating them in accordance of their ability to reduce the ignoble objectives that in many cases are likely to attack the noble ones, or to automatically generate incentives to misrepresentation or strategic behavior.

As a result, this essay's aim is to set out an interpretation of a sustainable democracy that would lead to think about the relevance of its requirement of well-balanced individuals, aware of their socio-political function and willing to fulfill it, to the kind of in which we live or are likely to live in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, no interpretation of this kind would be satisfactory unless it deals fairly with the major problems posed by democracy theory all over the history.

Democracy is created as a form of control to restrain individuals from a possible inclination toward the self-directed part of their nature. The desire to live free in a controlled environment, while not giving up on personal interests, power and the freedom to pursue it, expresses the duality of individual interests within the concept of the greater good. This form of government instrumentally allows them to maximize their possibility to thrive and prosper. Viewing itself as the most feasible mechanism whereby people may achieve their ideals of liberty (including political freedom) and equality (Dahl, 1991, p. 93), democracy, through the implementation of transparent self-government, is often seen as the most desirable system by which to govern a nation.

Democracy was seen as a healthy system that would, in one way or another, help human kind to overcome the dissension within their nature and lead to human development. It was viewed as the most reasonable system to manage what was often perceived as the inordinate or self-centered side of the human nature. However, the meaning and the reality of democracy has evolved because of the various circumstances through which it was implemented and the methods by which politics and rights have been exercised. For this reason, in today's Western culture, it is possible to discover that democracy appears in various manifestations because of the spectrum of its successes and failures over time.

Although most of the world's nations have become accustomed to democratic systems and rely heavily upon the demonstration of transparency, self-rule, citizenship, equal rights and liberty, they remain consistent in demanding a controlled order over an unbridled freedom that could take the form of disorganized chaos and anarchy. However, what people actually love about this system is their perception of freedom of choice, where they can "freely" select representatives with whom they agree or those who "truly care about people's best interests." While doing so, others focus too much on the right to vote per se and their freedom of expression while not taking a particular interest in their system's deficiencies.

The principles related to representative government, within a democratic system, created a revolutionary idea regarding people's active participation. While representatives were seen as a solution for reducing a multiplicity of problems related to the exercise of governance, democratic societies found them useful in making democracy executable to larger areas (Dahl, 1991, p. 29). Nevertheless, this idea brought with it a challenge that many had not been prepared to face: how to ensure that political leaders do what they are supposed to do, or mandated to do, instead of pursuing their own private interests, agendas and ambitions? For a democratic representative government to work properly, it is necessary that those who have been chosen to speak, vote, or make decisions for the people, do so in accordance with their socio-political function, and not on behalf of their private interests.

This brings up the question as to whether or not representatives are willing or able to effectively balance the conflicts of interest, which are inherent within their own human nature, with the interests of the people they are elected or appointed to represent. It stands to reason that, as time passes by, variations in moral and ethical values can be produced. In other words, preferences, beliefs and interpretations change and evolve. Additionally, the grounds for believing what we might rank at the top of our personal preferences may change depending on how the environment changes, how options and possibilities change, and how the restrictions we face to get what we want change.

Deeper still, within the context of conflicts of interest, it is warranted to ask how rulers deal with the heterogeneity of the people they represent and the challenges inherent to collective binding decisions. First, we must not forget that collective decisions involve large heterogeneous groups of people that have diverse interests and views. But, it is not possible to ascribe rational behavior to these groups because there is no collective rationality (Arrow's Theorem, 1950, p.333). Kenneth Arrow argued that preferences emerge exclusively from their own private situations, in other words, people's preferences are set as a pattern that define their tastes and desires. Since there is not a collective mindset, one cannot define precisely the preferences of a large heterogeneous group of people, thus there is an impossibility to create a function to maximize social utility (1950, p. 334- 335).

Democracy, as we may see, is not an incorruptible system and political leadership within it is not immune to corruption. Hence, adequate numbers of people must realize they have the power and the right to vote on relevant issues and they should ask: How effective is their system in generating equality in all spheres of life (political, economic, or social)? How effective is it in seeking the greater good and toward protecting the people's rights? And what is the relationship between political leaders' responsibilities and the people's rights and duties? Is it adequately reciprocal?

If someone evaluates contemporary democracies in terms of people's ideals, then one should be able to see the discrepancies between aspirations and actual facts. Some haven't properly understood the functions of democratic government because they were

more concerned with power and control than they were with the concept of the rule of law. Consequently, dissatisfaction with this system of government is often related to impatience and unreasonable expectations within its framework.

In spite of what people think about democracy, it has the ability to motivate specific behaviors because those who represent people's interests may present themselves as motivated by the moral principles people rank at the top of the society's value system. Hence, in a representative government, public deliberation may often prove ambiguous, not just because many voters may focus more on personality than on principles; but also because political discourse may appear as just a band of cold and flat words that have been designed to help a politician secure his or her position and power. There may not even be an implicit ideology attached to it, just meaningless words meant to say much without offering anything new or of value (Freire, trans 2005, p. 115- 117).

Furthermore, voters who exhibit a clear sense of disconnection, or even thoughtlessness, may contribute to additional problems related to the struggle of achieving a balance between increased participation and qualified participation. It is universally acknowledged that one of the requirements for an adequate democratic process to function is the opportunity for people to endorse the outcome they prefer. Robert Dahl (1991) argued in "Democracy and Its Critics" that even when people delegate their power to choose an outcome, they still have the power and the right to judge if what they received was not what they wanted; according to Dahl, that is a right they cannot yield (p. 99).

If participants in the democratic process were free from the shackles and the myths many have created around this form of government, they would be empowered to consider the efficacy of political leaders and whether or not they are acting in accord with their social function. Being aware that electoral consequences await those who deceive people, in order to retain or maintain their power, will certainly influence the political process, but the mechanisms they employ to preserve a redistribution that is most favorable to their private interests and agendas is what we are mainly concerned with here.



By way of illustration, and to anticipate the argument ahead of us, it is necessary to say that the discussion would be first focused on setting out an interpretation of human nature, the dissension within it, and how the society is influenced by it; due to the fact that such an understanding would be useful to comprehend democracy's ambiguous framework in terms of misrepresentation, control of the agenda, participation, public opinion and social utility. After reaching that stage, we will examine the unreasonable expectations around democracy that lead the individual to think that, with some arrangements, one would be able to implement a model of government that has proven to be out of order.

Finally, we will arrive to the conclusion that it is therefore mandatory to challenge people's idealization of democracy in order to understand that it needs to be continuously improved through the vigilance of an electorate. Even though democracy has been characterized as a transparent system, there is an unseen and real power defined by hidden interests that often influence the political process. It is necessary to challenge leadership's commitment to transparency and, in order to maintain legitimacy, to correct deficiencies within its system. The only way for that to happen is a well-informed and well-balanced society that has not just submitted to an outcome, but one that is also conscious about what matters and is meaningfully engaged in the political process.

## I. CHAPTER 1: DEFINING HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIETY

### A. Human Nature

Throughout human history, people have dealt with their need to understand what is inherent to their nature as a means toward explaining their behavior. With questions as to whether mankind tends to be either naturally cooperative or predisposed toward selfishness, many authors have confronted this issue and have provided tentative answers. Authors like Hobbes (trans. 2006) and Buchanan (1962) have argued that people are self-centered, with their actions and inclinations leaning toward the securing of a private benefit. Alternatively, there are authors, such as Aristotle (trans. 2013) and Batson (1999), who emphasized the virtuous character of humanity, affirming that individual choices are secondary, at best, to the welfare of others and the greater good.

Bearing in mind the complexities related to the examination of humanity, providing a definitive answer to fundamental questions seems to be problematic. This essay suggests, based on Smith's (1892) understanding, that human nature is essentially composed of two parts: A self-directed side, identified as one where individuals and subjective pursuits are placed; and an other-directed side, related to a communal way of life that is committed to human flourishing and concern for the well-being of the whole. When one prevails over the other, these two parts generate a dissension which is potentially ruinous, not only for individuals, but also for society.

It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate both sides of human nature in order to capture it as a whole. Instead of privileging one side over the other, Smith (1892) points out that both a "*concern for our own happiness*" (p. 262) and "*concern for that of other people*" (p. 262) are natural to humans. By asserting that humans are by nature either good or bad, there is a tendency to define people's character and behavior through a static paradigm, denying the complexity and dual character within human nature. Thus, the character of the human

being varies according to individual preferences, the environment and other external influences.

By examining human nature beyond ethical and moralistic interpretations, and to understand it as it is and not as it should be, by suggesting a realistic dualistic view, the astute may analyze what is inherent to it beyond condemnation, the desire to correct it or a denial of its reality.

1. Self-directed side

It is common to hear that human beings are by nature self-centered, on the basis that people act in accordance with concerns related solely to their individual interests and/or welfare. Hence, when a person is facing a situation which implies a decision making process, it is often said that he/she will seek the maximization of their own private utility because humans are limited to caring about their subjective needs and wants. By asserting this, such interpretations lead toward thinking that humans tend to secure subjective benefits, by any and all means possible, regardless of the welfare of others.

At first sight, this way of thinking can be related to Thomas Hobbes' (2006) definition of human nature, when after reducing it to its core elements, argued that people's actions are driven by appetite. Thus, living a solitary, poor and brutish life, humans have the same faculties to pursue their subjective interests and to protect themselves from the others. Since there is a manifest distrust between every individual, as a result of unlimited freedom and unlimited opportunity, people need to anticipate the actions of others in order to dominate and submit them to the supremacy of their private interests.

Additionally, David Hume (1896) asserted that there is an inherent characteristic within human nature: an insatiable greed to acquire goods that leads humans to act solitarily; in others words, Hume points out that human behavior is not fundamentally motivated by the common good of the whole, but

by a private interest. Even though Hume claims that in their subjective mindset people primarily tend to be concerned about themselves (otherwise, there won't be any need for justice), he recognizes that their concern is then extended to those with whom every person is emotionally connected and that there is a weaker concern prolonged to strangers.

Whereas Hobbes carries the idea of the self-centered characteristic of human nature too far, by insisting that humans do not care about anything but themselves, Hume acknowledges that people are neither absolutely selfish nor naturally benevolent, taking into consideration the difficulty of both, regarding the convergence of individual interest with someone in whom “*all the kind affections, taken together, do not overbalance all the selfish.*” (1896, bk III, part II, sect. II).

Accordingly, with Hume's interpretation in mind, it is necessary to challenge other versions that reduce human nature to the self-directed quality, not only because, in some cases, they tend to present humans as monsters, who pursue personal interests at the expense of others, but also because they fail to capture humanity's quality as a whole. Furthermore, the supposition of selfishness does not necessarily involve a negative connotation, because it is possible, by acting in accord with self-directed interests, to benefit one's family or even society.

It is clear, then, that the gist of the matter is the necessity of distinguishing between understandings that define people as excessively conceited or subjectively absorbed, from views that describe human selfishness in more realistic terms, in accordance with the complexities of the convergence of both self-directed and other-directed attributes. The former interpretation would argue that humans are incapable of being motivated for the common good, because of the extreme sense of self-importance and self-interest inherent within their nature.

On the other hand, the latter recognizes that people tend to instinctively preserve themselves, while seeking interests that may or may not extend beyond their immediate self. However, this natural instinct entails neither a desire for praise nor a calculative intent. It is, therefore, crucial to differentiate the guises in which one could define and understand the self-directed side of human nature in order to capture it entirely.

For instance, Smith (1982) manifests the importance of asserting the most accurate definition of the self-directed side of human nature, for the simple reason that it does not necessarily entail a natural egotism. He points out, at the very beginning of “Theory of Moral Sentiments,” his rejection of interpretations that privilege the selfish attribute of human nature, which indicates that humans are able to partially identify themselves with others:

"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principle in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it" (Smith, 1982, p. 9).

Smith’s examination of human nature makes it manifest that in the complexity of affections people are very capable of exhibiting pleasant feelings regarding others through sympathy. Therefore, Smith suggests that humans’ self-directed inclination within human nature can be categorized in self-preservation, self-interest, and self-love, and that not all of them are blameworthy. Conceptually, self-preservation is, in Smith’s words, “...*the great ends which Nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals*” (p. 77). Additionally, Smith asserts that:

"Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of

himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be so. Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man (...)" (1982, p. 82–83).

Even though love of oneself may be considered a selfish passion, this is a natural sentiment related to the self that motivates every single person to their own preservation and esteem. Therefore, it is non-blamable because there is not an implicit omission regarding a concern for others. However, this exists when there is not an excessive concern for the self or “*selfish gratifications*” (Smith, 1982p. 238), or a failure to generate fellow-feelings.

## 2. Other-directed side

Even though there is an axiomatic belief that humans are natural seekers of self-interest, it has also been acknowledged that a communal way of life is essential for people because it is through reciprocity that they would be able to satisfy their everyday needs. However, it is clear that within a community there is a multiplicity of interests, because of the fact that every individual has his/her own preferences, which can and do differ one from the other. This brings up the question of whether or not people are capable of displacement or leaving behind their private interests in order to prioritize the needs or interests of others.

Aristotle asserted that humans are social creatures and that it is only through the community that they are able to flourish; otherwise they would just remain confined to an immature pursuit of interests in an extreme private existence (trans. 2013, bk II, sect. I). Repudiating what is called individual subjective preferences, he also placed individual choices beneath the common good, highlighting the fact that individuals are only a part of a whole called the polis. Hence, the city turns out to be more important than the individual because it is not just a group of individuals, but an association with a shared course of action that calls for an active participation among the citizenry.

The questions still remaining are: Why do people concern themselves with others? Is there a natural instinct for doing so? Does it require a calculative intent? Accordingly, there are two possible answers: a) Human actions are an extension of a pursuit of self-benefit, regardless how favorable they are to others, b) People's behaviors might be motivated by a true concern for increasing the welfare of others.

As Hume sees it, a consideration of the public interest or the benefit of others, is not the main reason why the rules of justice are followed. If humans were able to do so, there would be no need for rules (1896, bk III, sect. I). Likewise, Buchanan has written: "*If people were saints or angels, the dilemmas we face would never have emerged in first place*" (2000, p.149), because he recognizes that in a "*genuinely anarchy world... conflict rather than universalized cooperation is its central feature*" (2000, p. 12).

Buchanan's answer starts with his pessimistic view of human nature. From his point of view, humans are asocial elements and the only reason they enter into an interchange is to seek self-benefit. Hence, everything people do, no matter how beneficial it is to others, is motivated by self-interest because, as stated by Buchanan, there is not such a thing as a displacement of the self-benefit to privilege others' welfare or the common good (1962). According to this author, individuals are capable of thinking of others' welfare, and are not necessarily motivated by an other-directed concern, but a concern on the self (p. 67).

On the other hand, Adam Smith (1982) asserts that concern for others and promoting their welfare is natural to humankind as well as the concern for the self because, in Smith's words:

Man was made for action, and to promote by the exertion his faculties such changes in the external circumstances both of himself and others, as may seem most favourable to the happiness of all. He must not be satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind, because in his heart he wishes well to the prosperity of the world. That he may call forth the whole vigour of his soul, and strain every nerve, in order to produce those ends which it is the purpose of his being to advance, Nature has taught him, that neither himself nor mankind can be fully satisfied with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full measure of applause, unless he has actually produced them. (p. 106)

It is, therefore, clear that beneficence is, from Smith's view, not only the virtue related to "*those affections only which aim at the happiness of others*" (1982, p. 267) but also the way in which people would be capable of promoting social utility. As a result, a disinterested benevolence, as "*something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary*" (p. 25), would help to diminish people's inclination to egotism through the "*mutual kindness, so necessary for their happiness*" (p. 225).

In addition to Smith's analysis, Dan Batson (1999) argues in favor of the "*empathy-altruism hypothesis*" which, in Batson words, "*includes feelings of sympathy, compassion, [and] tenderness...*" (sect. the empathy-altruism hypothesis and its egoistic alternatives) for others. According to this author, people are capable of feeling empathy toward others through altruistic motivations generating an "*other-oriented emotional response*" (sect. the empathy-altruism hypothesis and its egoistic alternatives).

Thus, this response involves not only an awareness of other's welfare but also, perceives it as a need; that is why he defines it as a "state of mind" (sect.



defining altruism and egoism) which makes people value others, and rank the welfare the others, as their ultimate goal. Therefore, Batson recognizes how important it is to understand that the empathic concern requires more than just feeling as others feel or perceiving others' feelings accurately; it entails "*feeling for the other*" (sect. the empathy-altruism hypothesis and its egoistic alternatives).

## B. Society

At first sight, society is defined by the interdependence between people resulting from their repetitive encounters through which they are capable of seeking a course of action to maximize their expected utility. As a result, humans have been understood as societal elements whose interaction makes possible the satisfaction of everyday needs. Even though it is clear that society is the result of that interaction, there is not a universal agreement related to the question about what motivated people to organize them and give away part of their individual freedom. Thus, this reality has generated all over history three possible responses exhibited by various authors at different times:

### 1. Natural tendency toward society inherent to human nature

Authors like Aristotle (trans. 2013) and De Vittoria (trans. 1946) have argued that the society comes naturally from individuals through communication, social relations and an inherent sense justice. From Aristotle's point of view, any human association is the result of the reunion of those who have “*the power of speech (...) intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient*” and some “*sense of good and evil, of just and unjust*” (bk I, sect. II).

Thus, the only possible way for humans to fully consummate their nature is throughout the city where they are submitted to law and justice (both civic values), far from which they would be “*the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony*” (bk I, sect. II). In addition, Aristotle recognizes the plurality within the community, whose aim is to achieve greater unity, in order for it to remain self-sufficient while different people fulfill different roles making different contributions (bk II, sect. II).

Likewise, De Vittoria (trans. 1946) indicates that society is not the result of human ingenuity, but it comes from nature itself, for the conservation of individuals whose need for friendship and justice, shape their will. Justice, then, as an ornament of the people's will, needs the society's will to be executed

because, otherwise, it will be just a formless idea. Therefore, De Vittoria asserts that even though people would be self-sufficient, their life will be sad because there is nothing in nature mandated to be isolated; in fact, he recognizes, as Aristotle does, that every living being tends to be in communication.

## 2. Individuals as a product of the society

From this perspective, society configures humans' existence in determining what they would be. Accordingly, Hegel (1990) points out that society produces the individuals it needs to accomplish its goals; they do not have self-awareness but they do manifest a class consciousness inherent to the atmosphere in which they were educated. Therefore, individuals are subordinate to the society in which their individual spirit is incapable of transcending it stops where it is meant to be. Similarly, Marx (1973) expresses that humans are directly related to the society which created them.

Therefore, there is not such a thing as an essence and/or self-awareness, as an abstract idea, inherent to each person, but a set of social relationships independent to their will that defines the class essence through which the society's economic structure is shaped. Hence, individuals, as societal elements or products of the system, are guided by class consciousness, ideas and value systems in their sociopolitical life.

Consequently, Schaff (1967) insists that humans are capable of judging what is right, wrong, honorable and dishonorable, due to the value systems given throughout the social relationships among them. It is, therefore, the structure of social relationships, primarily production relations, which determine people's relationships, opinions and attitudes according to their environment.

## 3. The society as a product of individuals

From this perspective, society is configured by individuals throughout an agreement motivated by fear (Hobbes, 2006), convenience (Locke, 1980),

and/or utility (Buchanan, 2000). Thus, humans are placed, by these authors, over societies that are subordinate to their will.

Hobbes (2006) explains that in the state of nature, people live in constant war due to the unlimited freedom everyone possesses and their natural passions. Humans, being equal in both body and mind faculties, live in fear and regard their self-security and their properties, which are in imminent risk of being taken by another, to be a priority because there is not any guarantee of protection. Therefore, looking each other with suspicion, they agree to give up part of their freedom in order to establish a social contract that will give power to an authority (sovereign) so that it can make all individuals, by any means, respect and fulfill that contract.

Even though love of unlimited freedom and their ability to dominate others, by creating this restriction over the self and the others, yields to the power of those can reduce the individuals' will through a common will (commonwealth), they are preserving themselves by doing so. Furthermore, once people have abandoned the brutish life of their nature, they will be able to achieve a better life because the faculties they used to protect themselves and their properties will not be wasted.

As Locke (1980) sees it, there is not any natural authority because individuals, who have unequal faculties, are born free and self-aware; therefore, society cannot impose consciousness. Despite the fact that he asserts that humans live freely by reason, he indicates that liberty is not license and that passions make individuals bad judges. As a result, he emphasizes that natural law prohibits harm to another and that is why people are mandated to leave some resources for others; otherwise a state of war will occur as a consequence of the threat of force caused when someone takes another's property. Therefore, society emerges as a means for protecting property rights and because the fact

humans are born with a right to question and are capable of rejecting arbitrary power, governing by consent is essential for governmental legitimacy.

On the other hand, Buchanan (2000) recognizes that the social contract comes as a result of the combination of the self-directed side of human nature and interdependence among people, privileging the maximization of utility over rivalry; that is to say, for example, a waitress treats a customer properly by making him/her feel comfortable in order to get a great tip, and the customer would be respectful and kind with the waitress to get a good service. Thus, the society is defined through Buchanan's point of view from a cooperative perspective based on people's needs, where everyone cooperates in order to receive reciprocal benefits.

Buchanan asserts the social contract is possible, in spite of the constraints implied to human behavior, because “*each individual must recognize that, were he to be free to violate convention, others must be similarly free; and, as compared to this chaotic state of affairs, he will rationally choose to accept restrictions on his own behavior*” (1999, p. 315). Therefore, no matter how equal or unequal people are, there is always an incentive to voluntarily agree to a social contract that will, in any case, protect the self by restraining those “*characteristic elements that we associate with the precepts of individualism*” (2000, p. 71).

Since it is clear that any society seeking to achieve the characteristics of civilization must recognize the need for collective actions, they must also participate in assuming the risks that it requires. Nevertheless, collective actions represent a challenge because of the difficulties that people must face when they decide to act. In light of this, it is often said that without a centralized action, groups tend to disintegrate when they are unable to secure them because of the multiplicity of competing goals and conflicts of interest.

On one hand, the multiplicity of goals that individuals can rank at the top of their order of preferences can be an impediment, if there is neither communication between people nor a coordinating mechanism that allows them to secure a benefit or an alternative benefit. Suppose a group, constituted of  $n$  individuals has two options:  $A$ ,  $C$ ; and it is necessary, through unanimous participation that every member secure a benefit although they cannot agree on which to choose. If individual 1, as a member of the group, chooses option  $A$ , while the other members choose option  $C$ , then he/she will not get any benefit ( $B$ ). The same situation would happen if individual 1 chooses option  $C$  instead of option  $A$ , as have other members of the group. On the contrary, if the individual 1 chooses option  $A$  (or the option  $C$ ) as well as the others members of the group, then he/she will get the benefit ( $B$ ).

<b>Individual</b>	<b>Other members</b>	
	<b>A</b>	<b>C</b>
<b>1</b>		
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>B</b>

As  $B > 0$ , there is a need for a coordination mechanism in order all individuals would be able to secure the dividends of cooperation.

However, a conflict of interest occurs as a result of the differing opinions people have regarding either the pursuit of the common interest, or the classification of different options at the top of their subjective preference hierarchy. Hence, continuing with the example defined above, it is possible to say that the benefits generated by each of the options are valued separately by members of the given group. Suppose now that individual 1 gets a benefit  $B_1$  only if all members of the group coordinate themselves to choose option  $A$ ; but he/she will get  $\beta_1$  if all members choose option  $C$ . From individual 1's view,  $B_1 \neq \beta_1$  and  $B_1 > \beta_1$ .

Likewise, individual 2, as a member of the same group, gets benefit  $B_2$  only if all the members coordinate themselves to choose option  $A$ , and he/she gets  $\beta_2$  if everyone in

the group choose option *C*. From individual 2's view,  $B_2 \neq \beta_2$  and  $B_2 < \beta_2$ . Thus, this hypothetical situation showing differences of opinion, about which interest the group should pursue, because they are rating differentially, a marginal benefit is produced by each option.

According to, Mancur Olson in “The Logic of Collective Action” (2009), he indicates that the lack of contribution among members of a group can be motivated by several factors such as: anonymity within the group, especially among the most numerous; the problem of efficacy related to the probability of any contribution that is particularly important in making a great difference; and, the inability to prevent non-cooperative members from receiving the benefits of the collective action once it has been achieved. Therefore, there are a lot of groups that, in spite of their common interests, remain latent because of their failure in securing a contribution, through selective benefits, that motivate people to act in a group-directed way (p. 50- 52).

In this regard, Jon Elster (2007) recognizes that there are two possible ways in which collective action can be coordinated: Centralized coordination and Decentralized coordination (p. 389). While centralized coordination requires a social mechanism through which a third individual/party (an organization, leader, the state, etc.) will ensure everyone cooperates by either establishing a punishment-reward strategy or by generating selective incentives, decentralized coordination refers to the possibility of collective action which can occur as a result of the combination of diverse motivations.

Therefore, centralized coordination denotes a mechanism through which a third individual/party would produce enough guarantees, contingent upon cooperation, to garner the trust and support required to secure the benefits obtained from the cooperative endeavor (Shepsle & Bonchek, 2005). Hence, when society establishes the procedures which provide people, as sociopolitical elements, with enough incentives to make the coordination and cooperation possible, collective actions occur.

However, as far as entrepreneurial or political leaders are concerned, the third individual/party that promotes coordination is the catalyst that creates the ability to detect an alternative benefit, resulting in a cooperation that provides a selective benefit that can be exploited. As one who, for a certain price (including votes, glory and/or recognition), and in spite of the cost or the risk, this helps the group to overcome the possibility of remaining latent. It is, therefore, clear that the actions of a third individual/party mechanism is not an incorruptible procedure because it is vulnerable to difficulties arising from the inappropriate nature of the incentives to which it is exposed.

Alternatively, decentralized coordination results from the existence of mixed motivations within a group, including those self-interested motivations that focus upon outcomes (or other factors that increase an average benefit) regardless of the cost or by avoiding the embarrassment of non-participation in the collective action (Elster 2007, p. 397). Therefore, the combination of these different motivations, in the author's words, "*can create the requisite snowball effect*" (p. 399) so the collective action can be materialized; and how successful the collective action would be "*depends on the distribution of the motivations in the population, and on the technology of collective action.*" (p. 399)

In order to pursue a positive marginal benefit, collective actions may involve making decisions, despite the multiplicity and complexity of the individuals' preferences and/or interests. Furthermore, collective decisions, as a mechanism to regulate matters of interest, face difficulty, in spite of the heterogeneity of people's preferences, by aggregating them in order to set binding agreements. However, this aggregation of preferences could be problematic because it can induce a process of strategic misrepresentation; but beyond any moral perspective, such strategic distortion can, paradoxically, lead to the achievement of an even better outcome by perhaps sacrificing immediate gratifications and benefits.



## II. CHAPTER 2: AMBIGUOUS FRAMEWORK

### A. Understanding Democracy

Democracy can be defined as a government system that involves a process of making collective binding decisions, within a political association, where citizens are equal before the law and active participants in ruling. Furthermore, democracy entails, since the revolutionary idea of representation arose, a government based on people's tacit consent. Therefore, as the source of legitimate authority, individuals are meant to freely choose their political leaders, causing power to flow from the people to those temporarily elected to represent them. But, beyond the act of choosing representatives, citizens' key role in a democracy is to participate in public life, while being aware of the issues affecting them, and to question their political leaders' decisions.

In a democratic system, therefore, citizens are required to be well-informed about public issues, so they can carefully watch those who have been given the authority to represent them and to act on their behalf. Even though voting is perhaps the most remarkable civic duty, the obligation to become informed, and to participate wisely, carries the most important implications for public life. For a democracy to work properly, it is necessary that all citizens fulfill their sociopolitical function, i.e. people should be educated about their democratic rights and responsibilities and actively involve themselves in the civic and political process.

Additionally, democracy is often described as a system in which citizens are protected by the rule of law, which applies equally to all citizens in order to preserve social order (preventing discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, gender, etc.), and to constrain the power of the government. Hence, law is, and must remain, impartial and independent from the other government branches so that legislation may be properly interpreted, judicial review can be properly executed and judgments can be properly rendered when constitutional rights and responsibilities are violated.

Even though democracy has been characterized as an incorruptible system, in which the rule of law will punish vice and corruption, it is necessary to recognize that the mechanisms of politics always have the potential to become corrupted, particularly when political leaders strategically misrepresent issues to their constituency, in favor of private preferences and/or interests. Incidentally, since societies are composed of various aims and causes that may be both complementary and oppositional, this requires an even more heightened sense of vigilance.

Therefore, recognizing the need to use a mechanism of rational foresight, through which a polity may adequately exercise proper decisions, in order to secure a better outcome and to prevent misrepresentation, through the pursuit of private preferences, it is necessary to consider both the impact and importance of accountability and constitutional limitations.

Preferences aggregation mechanisms are, therefore, not immune to manipulation through a strategic behavior because, in a very general sense, these mechanisms entail debate and deliberation, both complex procedures, due to their counterproductive character resulting in the possibility of persuasion and, in some cases, coercion that can produce in some individuals a reconsideration (or change) of his/her preferences. This manipulation of the preferences aggregation mechanism can be explained in light of an audience and a society's value system.

Even though mechanisms such as debates, discussions, deliberations, negotiations and voting are, from Amartya Sen's point of view, "*central to the process of generating informed and considered choices... [as well as] crucial to the formation of values and priorities, and we cannot, in general, take preferences as given independently of public discussion*" (1999, p. 10); they tend to generate incentives for an unclear and indirect manifestation of arguments involving self-interests, since a sincere exhibition of selfish preferences will cause several sanctions such as exclusion and social repudiation (Shepsle & Bonchek, 2005). Consequently, there is a need, in a public framework, to portray private preferences and selfish interests as strategic arguments. Regarding the values system of the

audience, giving them some sense of security in order to be worthy of trust and credibility often becomes a tool to advance agendas that may or may not be in the interests of the public good.

The process of strategic distortion of preferences defined above can even promote a certain course of action that could stray from the original one that fully matches with the individual's order of preferences. Incidentally, it should be noted that it is not possible to define this process of distortion as a transmutation of preferences because it might be understood from what Riker (1986) defined as "*heresthetics*", i.e. the process of structuring situations based upon the manipulation of preferences and alternatives, so that the strategic individual achieves the maximization of his/her expected utility.

Despite its ability to motivate strategic voting and/or misrepresentation of preferences, democracy is still perceived as perhaps the most feasible mechanism by which to govern a nation. On account of its ability to restrain individuals from a possible inclination toward the self-directed side of human nature, democracy requires the surrendering of an agreeable degree of personal freedom in order to secure an agreeable concept of the greater good. In fact, as Amartya Sen (1999) argues, throughout the twenty century, democracy, as a government system "*to which any nation is entitled*" (p. 4) , has become more accepted being very "*...difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.*" (p. 4).

Democracy, as it is now implemented all over the world, is a product of today's civilizations which manifest themselves as highly developed societies exhibiting moral and intellectual advancement. Not only the idea of what democracy should be has varied, but also the way in which its principles have been executed, as well as the mechanisms used to promote politics and rights. Despite the different manifestations of democracy, both in its practice and in the commitment to it, this form of government has been increasing to such an extent that now it is not uncommon to see people questioning its effectiveness toward protecting political freedom and civil rights, toward promoting active political and social participation, and toward guaranteeing the satisfaction of everyday needs.

## B. Fragility within democracy's arrangements

People have lost their ability to get amazed by the world. They are not considered themselves as “admirers” of it due to the fact that the world is no longer present itself as problematic despite the countless difficult situations that take place in it every day. Indeed, a mythical representation of the world has arisen owing to the personalization of politics and the lack of information in which decisions could be based on, which have generated superficial debates and disconnection from political process. Likewise, people have gotten used to the democratic system making it work, but ignoring that within it there is something more important to fix: democracy itself.

Defined as a system in which everyone is equal and has the right to vote and make binding decisions, democracy uses methods of social choice that, in many cases, involve discussion and deliberation, making it vulnerable to manipulation and persuasion. As a result, discourses in which value is given to the principles of democracy, such as transparency, freedom, participation and common good, are produced at the same time that actions, which do not support these principles, are developed.

In the light of this indiscriminate use of myths, those who have been chosen to make decisions for the people are able to maintain the status quo that is most favorable for their interests. Therefore, as the word implies consideration and action, if people do not perceive coherence between these two aspects, distrust and lack of interest on politics, and deeper still in public life, occur as a consequence. While this disengagement increase and the participation of people decrease, the only concern that arises is how to increase participation, because, as we will see, this is one of the most important principles for a democratic system to work. Nevertheless, by focusing on increasing participation specifically, people usually are not able to see or understand that this element, for its own sake, can enhance precisely the kinds of arbitrariness they seek to avoid in first place.

Thus, if the constituent elements of democracy are analyzed, it is possible to notice that there is ambiguity in some of its fundamental principles being therefore evident that the rational behavior people expect to occur within a democratic system is not what they take

for granted. Not being immune to corruption, democratic systems can produce results that are contrary to what is expected from them because of the complex interaction of its elements. In view of this, people's disconnection from the political process and their complacency with the outcomes despite their alienation can increase if they are not able to access useful information to understand how it operates and, in that sense, make decisions that are beneficial to themselves and the society.

Hence, Amartya Sen (1999) asserts that democracy has become a universal value on the base that not only its adherents have increased, but “...people anywhere may have reason to see it as valuable” (p. 12) because “its intrinsic importance in human life, its instrumental role in generating political incentives, and its constructive function in the formation of values” (p. 16). Even though in today's societies there is a general commitment to democracy, it is necessary to look forward those missing questions that would probably help to understand democracy' ambiguous framework especially regarding its main definition: ruled by the people.

It is universally acknowledged that democracy, as explained above, entails a political association ruled by the people among whom there is some form of political equality and who give away part of their freedom and power to a representative since a direct participation is not possible due to the size of democratic societies. This brings up the questions of who are to be considered the people and whether there is any general conditions or prerequisites of successful ruled by the people. Incidentally, one cannot forget that all over the history slaves, women and, in some cases, indigenous people were never perceived as part of the people; and as Sen (1999) asserted, it was until twenty century that the definition of people involves all, including women.

Accordingly, Sen (1999) recognizes that “*democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation*” (p. 10). Therefore, from this author perspective, a general condition for successful rule by the people would be the exercise of political freedom and civil rights through which people would be able to generate informed choices. Added to that, in order the principle of ruled by the people

could be successful people are mandated to generate enough pressure on the government so it can produce the right response. As Sen sees it, “[t]he exercise of political rights (such as voting, criticizing, protesting and the like) can make a real difference to the political incentives that operate on a government.” (p. 7)

To understand the ambiguous framework of democracy it is necessary to question the concept of the “rule” by inquiring how broadly or narrowly is the scope of rule to be construed. The gist of the matter is that all through history it has been acknowledged that people must face a limitation regarding the unpredictable character of nature that makes communication within a territory unreliable. Therefore, the extension of the ruling capacity of states in their own legitimate territory has been restrained to such an extent that, in many cases, the states have failed in their intent to have an active presence in some portions of their territory and some additional forms of power (not all of the necessarily legitimate) have arisen.

Apart from that, democracy has proven to be ambiguous regarding the authority given to representatives because it is not obvious that political leaders, as guardians, will seek the general good rather than their own (Dahl, 1991, p. 76) taking advantage of the control of the agenda that they possess to manipulate the outcomes. The question still remaining, then, is: how to ensure that political leaders do what they are supposed to do, or mandated to do, instead of pursuing their own private interests or agendas? Accordingly, James Madison (1788) recognized the need to restrain government structure and/or institutions in order to ensure they all would function properly far away from vice.

Therefore, Madison argued that due to the distribution of power on several departments within the government, it is essential to ensure those who manage the branches to fulfill their political function by giving them both enough personal incentives and constitutional means to fight back their ambition and the motivations that lead them to manipulate the outcome pursuing their self-interest. As Madison sees it, people interest, especially of those who were elected to represent, must be connected with the constitutional

principles, thus it is very important to secure the government from any possible abuses. As a result, Madison indicated that:

In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. (Madison, 1788)

The subdivisions within the internal structure of the government have been designed, from Madison's perspective, as a way to secure society not only from "*the oppression of its rulers*", but also "*against the injustice of the other part*" that can be motivated by the several interests resulted from the "*different classes of citizens*" within the society (1788). However, in the light of the principal-agent problem, Madison's checks and balances solution to avoid any kind of tyranny tend to produce more ambiguity within democracy's framework.

Even though the representative principle within democracy helped to overcome the limitation regarding the size of the nation and direct participation of the people, this brings up the issue of information asymmetry that people have to face dealing with the question of whether the representatives they elected have been effectively fulfilling the function because of which they were designated. The dilemma arise within a society due to the fact that political leaders acting as agents are, as any other individual, likely to an inclination toward the self-directed side of their nature as humans, thus they can displace people's best interest to the background motivated by his/her private interest and the fact that they have the power to manipulate the outcome on the bases that they decide on behalf of people.

The conflict of interest regarding the principal-agent problem arises when the principal's best interest may involve activities that are costly to the agent or simply is not connected to his/her best interest, and when the principal cannot observe what the agent

does because it is costly to him/her. One possible solution to this dilemma could be the creation, by the principal, some kind of incentives to motivate the agent to align his/her private interest with the principal's interests. However, there is always the risk of exploitation the principal faces is imminent due to moral hazard and the possibility of misrepresenting preferences by which the agent is liable to.

Consequently, democracy and the ambiguity within its framework must be analyzed from the human nature perspective since this system, as any other form of government, is a reflection of it and its complexity. As a result, Madison has asserted “[i]f men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary” (1788). It is, therefore, clear that by understanding human nature and individuals first motivations, one would be able to understand democracy being free of myths around it.

#### 1. Public interests vs Private interests

At first sight, it is clear that any system that tends to be democratic must entail, as constituent element, people's tacit consent because, as pointed before, the power flow from the people to those who represent them and their interests. Being equal before the law, citizens are protected by it from any vice and corruption that can result from the manipulation of the mechanisms of politics, caused by the strategically misrepresentation political leaders may do to take advantage from the imbalances that can occurs within any society, affecting politics itself and the outcomes produced.

In the light of this, society holds its own hierarchical value system in the base of which judges people's behavior, especially politicians' performance. Thus, any person whose behavior contradicts this system will be blame worthy and subjected to social rejection. Hence, any abuse of public roles or resources or, deeper still, the use of illegitimate forms of political power influenced by private interests will be broadly punished in the society.



Nevertheless, it is not possible to deny that even though democracy has been seen as the most feasible mechanism by which to govern a nation, it is clearly susceptible to the influence of those who decide, in Lasswell's (1936) words, "who gets what, when, and how". Bearing this mind, citizens must understand that if there is a certain degree of imbalances within their society, it would likely cause that someone benefits from it by using his/her power, money and/or authority to distort decision making process, and to divert the costs and benefits of policy or even resources.

What is more, any imbalance, benefiting private interests, would probably entail the opening up of illegitimate channels of political procedures and accountability. Even though such an abuse would likely not come to light easily, its consequences would rapidly weaken peoples' rights, block off the legitimate flow of power and contribute to make politics a competition between interest groups and parties of showing what is usually hidden.

Despite the fact that the "people's best interest" is supposed to be the base of the democratic system because the legitimate power emanates from them, there is an unseen power within the society that in many cases is the one who gets to influence the mechanism of politics, by getting its way in through the "back door". That unseen power is composed by those who have such resources that make them capable to compete politically and/or economically, and have the interest to do so, to get to control the public agenda in order to seize every possible benefit.

But, how is this possible within a democratic system where political leaders are supposed to pursue their social function to represent the people? First, one should be able to understand that, as Schumpeter pointed out, "[i]t does not follow that the social meaning of a type of activity will necessarily provide the motive power, hence the explanation of the latter" (1950, p. 282). Furthermore, one should be able to realize that the way in which the "public interest" and the

private interests interact within a democracy is a reflection on a large scale of the dissension within human nature.

Bearing in mind that someone's duty does not necessarily involve actions, conflicts would tend to occur regarding which side would motivate political procedures. In that sense, those actions purely motivated by private interests (self-directed side) are likely to be censured by the society where they happen. On the contrary, acts inspired on the public interest would tend to be socially accepted and exalted.

On account of that fact, Elster (1999) would claim that this situation causes political leaders (but also people in general) to hypocritical misrepresent their preferences or interests. In other words, they strategic present themselves as motivated to act in accordance to their social function and the principles people ranked first in their value system, specifically those which are socially glorified. By doing so, they seek to retain power and wealth avoiding the blame and shame produced by being perceived as having non-public-spirited aims. While such discourses adversely interfere with the realization of political, economic and social changes that may be necessary within society, they also tend to promote the perpetuation of problematic situations that afflict people

In the light of the hypocritical misrepresentation there would tend to be a homogenization of the expressed interests (Elster, 1999), which entails political leaders' discourses to be empty and insincere. As a result, public debates would become a way to express contents that, being snatches of reality, are meaningless since they are detached from the society in which they would make sense of (Freire, trans. 2005, p. 77).

## 2. Public Deliberation vs Meaningless Words

At first sight, any careful consideration or discussion of a specific problem can be a useful tool to make decisions, especially in a pluralist society where

different beliefs live together. In the light of democratic systems, deliberation and debates have been emphasized as some of the constituent elements within mechanisms of social choice, because they represent a way in which people can express different opinions related to a particular subject. Democracy, in this context, is thus just an extension of people's communicative action.

Bearing in mind that all members must be considered equally allowed to vote, the importance of debates and deliberation has arisen as a result of the flourishing idea of "deliberative democracy". Hence, by highlighting how essential is to base on a principle of debate any mechanism of collective decision that includes the participation of every person that can be potentially affected by that decision, deliberation has been thought as complementary to the notion of representativeness related to democratic systems.

Accordingly, collective decisions would only be legitimate if they come as a result of something less than unanimous vote brought about by public deliberation of the citizens on their, presumptively, common interests. Being a way in which it would be possible to get a majority who agrees with the outcome, public deliberation entails not just argumentation and public discussion of a particular subject, but also has need of taking into account others' interests, because any omission of them would not just harm people's dignity, but also be visibly contradictory to the democracy's constituent principles.

Nevertheless, it is important to understand that there is nothing superficial within a debate and/or deliberation. In fact, there tend to be some elements of ambiguity in this principle of deliberation that can enhance the kind of arbitrariness it seeks to avoid, by entailing persuasion that can be translated into a reconsideration of the preferences.

When a group of people discourse together a particular issue in order to form an opinion about which resolution is to be preferred, someone can misrepresent himself/herself to get an expected outcome. That is to say that deliberation operates as a mechanism for maintaining social order through strategic behavior owing to a widespread knowledge of human behavior would allow predicting it and would open the possibility to also act strategically to influence it and get an awaited result.

It is imperative, therefore, to recognize that it will only be possible to change the behavior of an individual as his/her mindset, composed of their desires, beliefs and interpretations, is changed. So, in the words of Schick (1997), abilities to induce (generate a change in desires), convincing (to generate a change in beliefs), and persuade (make a difference in the interpretations) constitute a strategy that combines in the ability to influence (ability to change the behavior of others), and this as well in the very meaning of power.

On the other hand, even though public debate and deliberation have been thought to promote the flourishing of democratic qualities not only within political leaders, but also within citizens by taking political discussion beyond to private interest, one should be able to see that any deliberation that involves a public would lead to the misrepresentation of the interests. For instance, given a certain value system held by a particular community, any decision supported by an argument which is based on a motivation or interests placed at the end of that value system, would be automatically rejected due to the fact that it is contradictory to what people ranked at the very beginning of their value system.

Therefore, being obligatory in a public deliberation to sincerely present those motivations that influence their behavior, people would tend to misrepresent themselves if the basis of their decisions is blame-worthy in order to keep moving forward in the pursuit of their private interest. On account of this misrepresentation, discourses would tend to be transformed, as pointed before,

in a bunch of cold, flat and meaningless words being, as a result, just an alienating verbosity in spite of their references about values and/or ideologies (Freire, trans 2005, p. 77).

Political leaders' behavior, from Freire's (trans. 2005) point of view, tends to have messianic background that hides their real interests. Consequently, they become efficient in promoting passivity among people by misrepresenting themselves in order to maintain their power and wealth. Thus, politicians' discourses are predisposed to say people what they want to hear but not the reality; in other words, politicians have a tendency to behave as who do not believe or trust in the people's capacity to think and to know (p. 62 -63).

Additionally, we must recognize that the idea of deliberation on matters relevant to the common interest within a democratic system involves the assumption that people would act or debate reflecting their private deliberatively informed judgments. However, a scenario where people deliberate in an unreflective and uninformed way is as well possible if one take into account the cost of the information and the access to it those people could have within a certain society; that is why such an assumption can be problematic due to it opens up the possibility that any person could influence that uninformed community getting to change their mindset and their behavior.

Consequently, Rousseau would argue that "*each voter is polled about his independently reached choice, without any group deliberation*" (Grofman & Feld, 1988, p. 570), not as an argument against the dialogue with others, but a way to secure every individual would be able to privately form his/her judgment about issues relevant to the common good. Thus, in the light of a well-informed judgment privately form, people would be able to dialogue or even vote accordingly their own preferences, beliefs and interpretations; otherwise, they would be, again, at a risk of persuasion, intimidation or even

impressed by others so they would debate or vote in accordance to the judgment of those others instead of their own.

### 3. Qualified participation vs increased participation

It is universally acknowledge that participation is one of the main constituent elements of a democracy, especially due to the representative principle that this system entails to function in largest areas. Thus, all over the history of the implementation of democratic systems, communities have given great esteem to participation as an instrument to achieve a stage of civilized society. As a result, participation has been place at the top of people's value system owing to its relevance to the legitimate flow of the power.

In the light of this high esteem to participation, political leaders, as well as the society in general, tend to promote the involvement of the citizens in the whole public and politic sphere, but more specifically in the decision making process. Therefore, any abstention would be frowned upon because it will in one way or another obstruct the proper flowing of the power. Hence, political leaders are likely to endorse policies that would help to increase participation, and people tend to support them as a way to strengthen their system.

However, what sometimes is ignored is that such policies would only be completely successful within a well-informed society where raising the number of people who participate would be the expected outcome. On the contrary, within an uninformed society, those policies would be counterproductive as they would likely to increase thoughtlessness as well, instead of a real commitment of the people with their system achieving, as pointed before, the opposite result to the one that they planned to.

Every decision that is up to be made requires information so the individual is sure that it is the right path to obtain what he/she expected, and is aware of the implications that it would produce. Nevertheless, it is imperative to recognize

that in many cases information is costly thus people do not have an equally access to it; consequently, it is not very accurate to assume that to design mechanism to increase people's participation would maintain or improve the quality of the participation on its own, because if the information is costly, then not every individual capable of making decisions would be able to have a perfect knowledge about what can affect his/her decision.

Therefore, in a uniformed society in spite of having a democratic system, individuals would not have well-structured preferences or interests leading to a certain grades of indecisiveness which would make it even more difficult to come to a non-ambiguous decision due to the ignorance about its implications. In accordance, Downs (1957) asserted that people would not be capable to have a real and accurate understanding on what the government ought to do to serve their interests in a society where knowledge is imperfect and information require to overcome ignorance is costly,.

Additionally, if people do not have a perfect knowledge to determine what is the best for him/her, persuasion would arise and become effective to support ideologies and interest that, in some cases, would have the tendency to be contradictory to what people really want and need. In others words, persuaders would be efficient in influencing individuals' mindset, convincing them that the group they are supporting and the goals they represent –to obtain political favors o benefits by getting people to vote– is favorable to people's best interest Downs (1957).

Therefore, in an unequally informed society, persuasion would become a business founded on the imbalances within the society, and the individuals. Incidentally, we must analyze that this situation involves a restriction related to the importance of every person in front of the government. Hence, if there are some individuals capable to get to influence others on the base of an unequally

access to the information, that would mean that the government is not giving the same consideration to people's preferences and concerns.

Likewise, this situation, that is certainly contradictory to the principles of a democratic system, represents an instance of the principal-agent paradox in terms of the asymmetrical information between the principal and the agent. Thus, having access to more specific information, the agent would have an incentive to take advantage of it while manipulating the principal through an strategic of misrepresentation in order to make the principal to think that his/her interests are guarded.

Whilst promoting an enlightened understanding of the reality would make people capable of participating successfully in the public and politic sphere, by making well-informed decisions that would be translated into benefits for them, political leaders, on the contrary, being ignorant about what people want them to achieve and guided by the motivation to misrepresent themselves in order to pursuit their own private interests, would be efficient to hinder people's access to the information by controlling the mechanism in which they can get to know what is happening within their society. People would, then, remain passive and would not question their situation because they do not have a perfect knowledge of it.



### III. CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGING PEOPLE’S IDEALS REGARDING DEMOCRACY

#### A. Expectations and Imbalances

Despite the challenges that democratic systems are likely to face and that they are not yet implemented, or even accepted, all over the world, people have tended to get accustomed to this form of government so deeply that democracy has been “*taken to be generally right*” (Sen, 1999, p.5). Indeed, people often tend to stop thinking about questioning the system –asking, for instance, how effectively has democracy functioned? Or how successful has it proven to be? – because, again, there is a strong tendency to take for granted that this system would entail positive results. This familiarization with democracy has involve the creation of expectation around it; thus, people have a propensity to value a truthful representation and a non coercive public debate, while giving not enough importance to the convenience and efficacy of their effects.

Likewise, institutions within a society entitled to be democratic are expected to be just practical and mechanical entities, simply configured to deal with the communities’ requirements. Consequently, any behavior that involves a purpose which differs or contradicts, in some way or another, this technical understanding of the social function derived from the public life, would be socially rejected. Dissatisfaction with democratic governments is, then, likely to arise when the reality is not equivalent to the (unreasonable) expectations regarding the system people have a propensity to hold.

As democracy is not, as pointed above, an incorruptible system and it has, indeed, the ability to automatically generate incentives to misrepresentation and strategic voting, it is therefore imperative for people get free from the shackles and the myths they have created around democracy’s framework. In the light of such liberalization, people would be

able to analyze the fact that they are trying to implement in sizable societies a system that was first designed for a small civilization where it took shape and in which it collapsed.

There is, thus, a need to figure out what a democratic system means and what does it entail, trying to get a picture of the system' reality in order to evaluate the vices that it could have, in order to reduce them. As a result, one would be capable to inquire what is at stake and the root causes of corruptions and sophisms among political leaders, so as to come to the conclusion that those degeneracies within the system are a consequence of the imbalances, not just within the society between the political and economic spheres, but deeper still within the individuals who are members of it, because imbalances within humans are likely to get to influence the whole government shaking the institutions that belong to it since the technical functions they involve are performed by humans, and the system, as well as the society, is a reflection of the human nature.

If someone evaluates the impact of having imbalanced individuals and society, one could easily identify that from those imbalances are derived the incentives for misrepresentation and strategic behavior, the root causes of the malfunction of the system, i.e. what makes it being less democratic. What is more, being aware of the imbalances within the system, the society, and the individuals, implies the ability to recognize that those disproportions tend to benefit a person or a group, who traffic influences within a given situation of opportunities, resources, and constrictions, in order, for example, to get to distort decision making mechanism by capturing the state and its institutions.

The reason for that to happen is that such disproportions generate a scenario where it is feasible to obtain a tangible, and the most of the time immediate, benefit, while the costs of doing so are likely to be distant, broadly shared in some cases, and not enough concrete. Hence, to pursuit a position of advantage (and to try to maintain it by almost all means possible) is not just the most common behavior, but a rational one because a consideration of the benefits from the perspective of the preferences and beliefs would lead to see that those benefits are a positive reflection of the desires, and additionally, because the costs do not exceed the them.

Therefore, it becomes reasonable to think that any particular combination of disproportions within the individuals and the society, and the political and economic power, is likely to generate conditions for certain ways of corruption to arise. As Huntington (1968) asserted, in any possible scenario where economic power or opportunities are exceeded by political power, people would tend to utilize that power to acquire wealth for themselves; likewise, any situation in which political power gets exceeded by economic power, individuals would probably make use of it to catch political opportunities (p. 56-71).

Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to see that imbalances within human nature and the society are constituted by important dynamic forces such as private and public interests, and political and economic power. What is more, the relationships between these forces, for instance, within the human nature would be reflected on the society and the government, because individuals constituent the core of the society, and such relationships are the base on which the flourishing of the society would occur.

## B. Oxymoronic concepts

People's mindset has been framed to think and care about the common good, social welfare, and public opinion, but also other concepts that get to be the focus in which people emphasize. What is more, one of the striking aspects of this issue is that such concepts get to control politicians' discourses not because they actually believe or care about them, but because among people there is a high esteem for them even though when it is almost impossible to establish a clear and unambiguous definition of them. Deliberation on these concepts seems to be not necessary though people are not capable to explain them accurately. Indeed, a lot of people claim for them because those concepts have become so natural to their life in communities, in spite of the fact that they may not clearly understand their meaning and implications.

While a number of key issues arise from the definition and characterization of these concepts, people keep trying to preserve them as they represent the base upon which the whole society has developed its value system. For instance, it is often asserted that the common good (or people's best interests) represent a shared ideal beneficial for the members of a given society; and even though it can often change, there are certain requirements that remain basic for the greatest number of people.

Some would argue then that it is possible to think the common good as the total aggregation of the every private interest held by all individuals within a society. However, others will see such an interpretation as a narrow understanding because it asserts that the common good is a reducible quality that, indeed, is not efficient to define the scope of this concept. The greatest possible good, then, in its broadly accepted sense, represents the final goal of the society because reaching it would lead, presumably, to the welfare of the community.

Likewise, social welfare has been explained, in its general sense, as a public function aimed to alleviate social problems and the distress they may cause ameliorating them, in order to enable people to cope with their changing conditions. In accordance to its social understanding, it is not accurate to equate social welfare to living standards because, the

former would tend to denote an extended range of organized activities that pursue to contribute to find a way out of social problems improving people's quality life. Furthermore, it has been said that social welfare is one of the society's fundamental function owing to its presupposed key role in promoting people's flourishing and the successful mobilization of social, political and economic resources in order to deal effectively with the social requirements of the community.

As well as the definitions of the common good and social welfare, any effort to define public opinion end up referring to an aggregate of individual preferences, beliefs, and interpretations expressed by a substantial amount of people within a society. However, some authors like Glynn et al (2004) would argue that public opinion is more than just a synthesis of a given proportion of individuals by emphasizing its role as an important force in world's politics that, translated into policies, would tend to shape the institutions. Therefore, public opinion is, from Glynn's point of view, worthy of people's attention because, as he asserted, "*if one thinks of public opinion only as the result of opinion polls, one will not achieve a sophisticated understanding of (...) political culture*" (p. 4).

Additionally, Glynn et al. (2004) pointed out that more than a collective broad agreement, public opinion results from social processes that entail interaction and mutual influence related to people's considerations about their feelings regarding lifestyle concerns, political issues and social practices and matters. For this reason, public opinion, entrenched in culture, has a deterministic role in almost all societies' spheres, particularly in public and privates debates and in shaping the general state of politics, which makes it a relevant concept in public life.

Despite people's effort to define and to understand these concepts unambiguously, it is imperative to think how is it possible to establish a general agreement that would shape the social meaning of the common good, social welfare and public opinion within a given sizable society, when sometimes such an agreement is unachievable in small groups because of the heterogeneous preferences, beliefs and interpretations people hold. Accordingly, Lippmann (1998) indicated that:

The living impressions of a large number of people are to an immeasurable degree personal in each of them, and unmanageably complex in the mass. How, then, is any practical relationship established between what is in people's heads and what is out there beyond their ken in the environment? How in the language of democratic theory, do great numbers of people feeling each so privately about so abstract a picture, develop any common will? How does a simple and constant idea emerge from this complex of variables? How are those things known as the Will of the People, or the National Purpose, or Public Opinion crystallized out of such fleeting and casual imagery? (p. 193)

Thus, by asserting this, Lippmann highlighted the complexity inherent to the definition of such concepts as public opinion and the common good, inquiring the general assumption that individual coherence would, somehow, tend to produce social coherence as well. Similarly, Sen (1999) pointed out how problematic is to equate social judgments with individual's judgments on the base of the divergent interests within a group, community and, deeper still, within the society. Thus, at the very begging of "The Possibility of Social Choice", Sen questioned social choice theory by asking:

How can it be possible to arrive at cogent aggregative judgments about the society (for example, about "social welfare," or "the public interest," or "aggregate poverty"), given the diversity of preferences, concerns, and predicaments of the different individuals within the society? How can we find any rational basis for making such aggregative judgments as "the society prefers this to that," or "the society should choose this over that," or "this is socially right?" Is reasonable social choice at all possible, especially since, as Horace noted a

long time ago, there may be “as many preferences as there are people”? (p. 349)

Hence, one should be able to understand that even though groups of people are formed due to an interest regarding presumably a common concern, it does not mean that those individual share the same preferences, beliefs and interpretations about the same issues. Indeed, within a group, people would have to make a decision in spite of their heterogeneity, which within a sizable society is likely to cause preference cycles making even more difficult to come to a decision because, in some cases, the final product would entail ambiguity and inconsistency. While individuals can be define as rational subject due to their transitive preferences, on the contrary, society tend to exhibit certain intransitivity because of the inconsistency between the preferences of the people, that would lead to irrationality<sup>1</sup>.

Thus, by asserting that the society or a group, as well as the individuals, are rational based on the assumption it has “*subjective attitudes and drives such as those possessed by a human being*” (Shepsle, 1992, p. 8), one tends to succumb to the fallacy of composition. Such an affirmation entails a flagrant intention to ascribe people’s behavior as individuals to the society assuming that is right since they are part of it, and, therefore, what is true for individuals would presumably be true as well for the society, which is a wrong conclusion as Arrow (1950) illustrated with his “Impossibility Theorem” that stands that there is not any minimally reasonable mechanism of social aggregation of subjective preferences capable to ensure an outcome that fulfill rationality conditions.

Is it possible, then, to determine the meaning of those concepts for a sizable society if opinions and interests represent just an aggregation of individual’s frame of mind, and there is not a collective mindset?, and more important how is it possible? Discourses within a democratic system tend to be full of references regarding the common good of the people, social welfare, and public opinion as a way to talk about the aggregate interests of the members of the society; such an interpretation involve an understanding of the society,

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<sup>1</sup> Condorcet paradox in Shepsle & Bonchek, 2005

which privilege a consideration that tends to ascribe to the society purpose and subjective aims. Nevertheless, “(...) *it is still fruitless to attribute intent to the product of (...) collective efforts*” (Shepsle, 1992, p.8).

As a result, it is imperative to ask, as well as Sen did, how is it possible to define unambiguously what is the greater good of a given society?, or deeper still, how is it possible to shape a public opinion on the base of society’s irrationality?, because such questions would lead us to what seems to be the gist of the matter: those concepts involve a deliberate combination of two words that have opposite meanings; in others words, public opinion, the common good, and even social welfare are oxymoron because they are, in Shepsle’s words (1992), “*internally inconsistent, self-contradictory expression[s]. Therefore, [they have] no meaning. To claim otherwise is to entertain a myth (...) or commit a fallacy (...)*” (p.1).

Incidentally, one must not forget that individuals’ behavior represent the materialization of their mindset, which is formed by their private desires, beliefs and interpretations (Shepsle & Bonchek, 2005). Therefore, personal opinions, private interests, and individual welfare are shaped in the subjective mindset of every person, accordingly to their private desires, beliefs, and interpretations. However, as Shepsle (1992) maintained, “*individuals have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not*” (p. 11). If it is no possible to ensure that a group (the society in this case) would come with a coherent and consistent decision, then who gets to decide what those concepts mean? Accordingly, the process of sculpting the meaning of “the common good”, “social welfare” and “public opinion” on the base of collective rationality come from a private sphere compose by those who have the resources to compete to get (political or economic) power since there is not such a thing as collective rationality (Condorcet Paradox in Shepsle & Bonchek, 2005)



### C. Melting away the imbalances

An accurate understanding of the human nature would lead to identify ways in which it would be possible to pursue democratization goals that fit appropriately to the society taking into account that the varying realities and situations differ from one community to another. Consequently, there is a need for developing a checks and balances system capable to deal contingently with the imbalances derived from human nature, in order to stay away from any intention to misrepresentation and to take advantage of the imbalances.

In accordance, such a checks and balances solution would have to lead to a scenario where both political power and economic power, and the interests derived from them, do offset one another in such a way that political leaders, interest groups and the people are able to get to influence one another resisting any coercion or exploitation because they are adequately balanced, reducing then the rise of any temptation to trade either economic opportunities or political power.

The gist of the matter is that a checks and balances system would only tend to be effective if there is not any kind of negation toward the dissension within human nature. It is imperative to see that neither the self-centered side nor the other-directed side of the human nature are bad or full of vices; indeed, the unhealthy part of the human nature is an extremely inclination toward one side, that is why a balance of these two forces is necessary.

Hence, any explanation intended to describe politicians' behavior from the perspective of the function they are mandated to do as representatives of the people, is just a technical understanding derived from a practical and mechanical perspective of how the government and its institutions work because it would have the tendency to negate the dissension within human nature and, particularly, the self-centered side. Such interpretations would only lead people to misunderstand the system and its functioning, and, again, to create unreasonable expectations regarding it.

Therefore, any society entailing to be democratic would necessarily intend to melt away the imbalances within the society, because by doing so, a sustainable democracy would be achievable as balances are likely to involve democratization. It is noteworthy that in any democratic society tending to be sustainable, human nature would have to be valued in itself; because any aim to change it, or deeper still to negate it, would end up being translated into more vices and leading, again, to unreasonable expectations. Consequently, it is possible to propose some circumstances in which a sustainable democracy would be feasible:

- It is imperative for individuals to get to balance the dissension within their human nature. While inclinations toward one of the side of the human nature would tend to make people behave in such manners that will affect others (if the inclination is toward the self-centered side) or affect themselves (if the inclination is toward the other-directed side), balanced individuals would be able to pursuit their private interest without forgetting to accomplish their social function as the legitimate source of authority. This would lead to strengthen civil society and, for instance, to put an end to political machines involving exploitation of public positions and functions, or resources, and/or illegitimate treatment of political influence.
- To open up channels to make information to flow effectively. A well-informed society would lead enhance decision-making that, otherwise, will be hindered by the lack of knowledge. If the information flows effectively, then individuals would be able to overcome ignorance and to properly decide on the base of an accurate calculation of what best serve to their interests knowing and understanding politician leaders' behavior (Downs, 1957). Likewise, a perfect would, consequently, make people to be aware of their socio-political function having the tendency to mass self-expression because people would see a well-defined path from decision-making structure.

- Open up, as a result, channels of qualified participation. This conditions requires more than public policies to enhance mass participation because, as asserted before, any promoting of mass participation for its own sake, without encouraging an well-informed participation, would generate the kind of vices it would presumably trying to avoid. For instance, those kinds of policies would not contribute to enlightened public deliberation; instead, they would stimulate misrepresentation and strategic behavior that politicians leaders, and in some cases interest groups, would use as a sophism or as an (mediocre and deficient) alternative for offering a real political debate.
- It is noteworthy that in a society where the knowledge is imperfect and the information is costly, the rational behavior tends to be the indifference toward public issues because they do not seem to be important (Downs, 1957). In this sense, in a society where knowledge is perfect and self-expression values have been promulgated, well-balanced and well-informed individuals would have the tendency not just to be efficient in governing their lives being and expressing themselves, but also they would be empowered citizens who, conscious of their duties regarding public life, are capable of demanding democracy.
- At this point, it is imperative to assert that not such a balance of the dissension within human nature would be efficient to lead to a sustainable democracy, unless the imbalances within the society, i.e. the disproportions between the members of the society, are balanced because if the society remains imbalanced, then there would be incentives to try to get an advantage positive through which catch the benefits derived from those disproportions. Likewise, an imbalanced society would make people remain ignorance since to demand democracy would not be a higher priority as the conditions that guarantee the preservation or survival of the self remains uncertain; hence, a balanced individual would only fulfill his/her aspiration for democracy through his/her self-expression, if he/she has the basic needs

(physiological and psychological) properly guaranteed (this condition would lead as well to end political machines and intends to manipulate political processes and economic resources).

- It is possible to say, then, that balanced individuals would lead to balance, as well, the relationship between the private interests and the public interests within the society. That is to say that there is a need to imperative consolidate and preserve such a balance by reinforcing its boundaries; otherwise, intends to abuse of the system would be likely to remain, influencing decision making and the production of the outcomes and turning the system and the political processes developed within it into a silent auction, which would probably end up perverting the system by weakening the administration through the deviation of wealth and power.

This brings up the question of whether or not as sustainable democracy would be a system toward which people would have some preference. Bearing this question in mind, it is possible to say that if we think in a hypothetical scenario in which individuals have three options regarding the kind of system they would prefer to have: a) A system in which there is not efficiency in the process of providing outcomes, accountability is not effectively developed, and there are imbalances within the society between political power and economic opportunities; b) A system that functions appropriately due to the rigorous accountability process producing positive outcomes, but there are some imbalances still remaining; c) A system that gets to balance the disproportions and to produce positive outcomes.

It is noteworthy then that these options tend to privilege one of the sides of the human nature while negating the other; thereby, option *a* is likely to be inclined extremely toward the self-centered silencing the other-directed side; in contrast to it, option *b* leans towards the other-directed side while it tries to suppress the self-centered side.

Thus, each individual would organize their preferences in such a way, he/she would be able to establish what option represents more accurately his/her ideal point, and,

consequently, he/she would be capable to determine what option differs in some way or another from the ideal point, placing them in direction away from the option that represents what he/she desires the most.

In the light of such distribution of the preferences, it is possible to assert that different majorities would be produced as a result, toward one option or another. Therefore, those persons who have enough resources to compete for catching as more benefits (derived from the imbalances within the society) as they can so they can maintain their position of advantage while abusing of public resources and roles and using illegitimately political and economic influence would, presumably, have an inclination toward the option *a* that defines a system where they would be able to keep doing so.

On the contrary, people who place democratic principles at the top of their subjective order of preferences on the base that they value these principles, and the positives outcomes, in themselves, would have a tendency to prefer option *b* since it define a well-functioned system due to the accountability and the vigilance of an electorate. In the view of the heterogeneity in the preferences, it gets even harder to decide and to obtain a consensus.

Nevertheless, it is possible for such a community to come with a consensus regarding the system in spite of their heterogeneity because there would be a certain distribution that individuals would consider as “not the worst” (Shepsle & Bonchek, 2005). Individuals would be likely to prefer the system that serves the most to their interests. Thus, they would have an inclination toward a system where they accomplish appropriately their social function, while not giving up on the pursuit their private interests and not being blame worthy; a system where also positives outcomes are produced, the information flows as well, and there is a tendency to privilege enlightened participation. Such a system that entails certain grades of consensus because it is “not the worst” possible scenario represent, what this research understand as, a sustainable democracy.

## CONCLUSION

This essay has tried to understand that even though it might be difficult to set out an interpretation of human nature without the ethical and moralistic understanding, it is necessary to do so because these perspectives tend to hinder any process of explaining human behavior making it be, in some cases, blame worthy; which only would lead to a misunderstanding of the root causes of people's behavior.

As a result, this essay tends to privilege a definition of the human nature which includes an accurate understanding of the two forces within it: self-centered side and other-directed side; since it has been asserted that each of them gets to influence people's preferences and interests recognizing that humans are very capable to privilege actions to preserve the self, as well as to privilege actions that reflect their commitment with others.

Likewise, it has been said that the dissension within human nature gets to influence the society, since it comes as a product of human interaction. Therefore, there is a dissension between private interests and public interests within the society due to the heterogeneity among its members. As a result, society, as well as individuals, is susceptible to an inclination toward noble or ignoble interests and preferences if they do not get to offset one another appropriately; this would, subsequently, affect the system by getting to imbalance it.

What is more, people create expectations regarding their government based on the way in which they think it function. Then, if the information or the knowledge is not appropriate, then people's expectations would tend to be unreasonable because they are likely to be based on myths. Hence, being free from them would lead to develop a more accurate understanding of the system identifying of imbalances within society and the individuals.

Thus, in any society entailing to be democratic in which there are imbalanced interests and, additionally, there is an imbalance between political power and economic opportunities, intentions toward democratization for their own sake, would end up generating more arbitrariness since the misrepresentation and strategic behavior would arise, as well as people's lack of interests in politics, hindering the enlightened understanding of public life and social duties.

Therefore, it is argued, as one of the principal conclusions, that any effort to restore the balance in the relationship between wealth and power within the society, and between the two sides of the human nature, might contribute to democratization leading to promote sustainable democracy. Nevertheless, it would be too pretentious to assert that any democratization process would lead automatically to reduce corruption or misrepresentation because that would imply that the more democratic a government or a society is, the freer it would be from the ambiguity and the problems exposed above, which is a limited understanding of the relationship between the forces within the society.

The preceding argument has tried to identify the necessity to question people's representation of democracy that involve valuing in itself and taking for granted that it is the best system by which to govern a nation. Therefore, this research is trying to suggest that it is imperative for people to develop an accurate understanding regarding the functioning of the system because, as presented before, democracy is able to promote and reinforce the kind of vices it was created to prevent if it is not well-implemented (it does not mean democracy has to remain the same in every society since there are great differences in the communities structures).

Accordingly, this essay does not pretend to assert that democratic systems entail corruption; instead, what it is trying to point out is that if the constituent elements and the institutions within a democratic system are imbalanced, as well as the society and the individuals, then corruption would occur as a result because people would seek to maintain position of advantage that serve to their subjective interests.

Hence, any effort to achieve a sustainable democracy must not negate the dissension within human nature by promoting a technical understanding of it. Instead, we must develop an understanding of the human nature that would lead to value it in itself; otherwise, misrepresentation would arise as a way to fit into the unreasonable expectations held toward the system, and particularly toward the individuals.

Are we really capable of silencing our self-centered side in any situation? The answer would be no, because, as explained above, this side is related to the preservation of the self, and regardless the situation, we would tend to protect ourselves on the base of the self-esteem; and as natural sentiment it must not be reduce to a negative understanding asserting that it would entail affectations to others.

Therefore, a sustainable democracy entails coherence and consistency without negating either the self-directed side or the other-directed side of the human nature. As a result, it would be considered as “not the worst” option by the different majorities within the society; so, those individuals who would seek to maintain a system in which they are able to abuse of public roles and public resources with almost no costs, will prefer it as they can still pursuit their private interest while executing their social function; similarly, those individuals who care for transparency, accountability and all democratic principles would rather to have this system because it would tend to privilege positive outcomes for the society—it is noteworthy that this is not a sworn statement, it is just a proposed path developed and justified in a purely conceptual level—.

Finally, it is evidently that the main circumstances in which such a sustainable system would be effective and achievable include well-balanced individuals, as well as a well-balanced relationship between political and economic spheres within the society; well-informed society so individuals are not just aware of their social responsibilities, but also are willing to fulfill them so as member of the society, they get engage in public life; and, an enlightenment understanding of the system that lead to enhance people’s commitment with the system through the way of qualified participation.



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